The Rule of Good Law and Federal Taxation by Sneed, Joseph T
Boston College Law Review
Volume 2 | Issue 2 Article 1
4-1-1961
The Rule of Good Law and Federal Taxation
Joseph T. Sneed
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Tax Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more information,
please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph T. Sneed, The Rule of Good Law and Federal Taxation, 2 B.C.L. Rev. 203 (1961),
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr/vol2/iss2/1
BOSTON COLLEGE
INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME II
	
SPRING, 1961	 NUMBER 2
THE RULE OF GOOD LAW AND FEDERAL
TAXATION
JOSEPH T. SNEED *
I
THE STANDARD TO JUSTIFY "CONFIDENCE"
In McCulloch v. Maryland,' counsel for the state of Maryland,
Mr. Hopkinson, framed an argument which has a startingly modern
ring when lifted somewhat from its context. It was addressed to Mr.
Webster's point that "An unlimited powerto tax involves, necessarily,
a power to destroy.' "What," said Mr. Hopkinson, "have we opposed
to these doctrines, [those supporting the power of the state to tax
the Bank of the United States], so just and reasonable? Distressing
inconveniences ingeniously contrived; supposed danger; fearful dis-
trusts; anticipated violence and injustice from the states, and con-
sequent ruin to the bank. A right to tax is a right to destroy, is the
whole amount of the argument, however varied by ingenuity or em-
bellished by eloquence. It is said that the states will abuse the power;
and its exercise will produce infinite inconvenience and embarrassment
to the bank.... What power may not be abused; and whom or what shall
we trust, if we guard ourselves with this extreme caution? The com-
mon and daily intercourse between man and man; all our relations
in society, depend upon a reasonable confidence in each other." 3
We all remember how Mr. Chief Justice Marshall dealt with
this insistence that the national government rely upon "confidence"
for its protection against taxation. Also we remember how the
Colonies were not content to rely solely upon "confidence" in their
* Professor of Law, Cornell University; B.B.A. 1941, Southwestern University;
LL.B. 1947, University of Texas; S.J.D. 1958, Harvard University.
1 17 U.S, (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
2 Id. at 326.
3
 Id. at 347-49.
203
BOSTON COLLEGE INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL LAW REVIEW
claims in respect to taxation. Edmund Burke's Speech on American
Taxation, which emphasized the reliance by Americans on Principle
in resisting the duty on tea, still touches a responsive chord in our
hearts. Our memories, given leave to dance about in history, can
recall other rejections of the defense of repose and confidence against
taxation: Mr. Joseph H. Choate's argument in Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan and Trust Co.; 4 Mrs. Frothingham's unsuccessful fight to give
the taxpayer standing to challenge a federal appropriation act,' and
Mr. Justice Butler's observation in Edwards v, The Cuba Railroad
Company6 that the Sixteenth Amendment "is to be taken as written,
and is not to be extended beyond the meaning clearly indicated by
the language used." 7 All are examples of the desire to erect barriers
against the power of taxation of a sort more substantial than mere
confidence. There are many others, of course; but, in one sense at
least, Mr. Hopkinson's adjuration to the national government has
become that of the national government to its citizens and taxpayers.
"Judicial ardor," as Professor Lowndes puts it, "for constitutional
tilting with federal taxes"' has almost disappeared. A recent guerrilla
attack by lower federal courts upon the premium payment test for
inclusion of insurance proceeds in the gross estate of the deceased for
estate tax purposes was smoothly repulsed by the Supreme Court
which pointed out again that the federal taxing power is little ham-
pered by the due process clause or the requirement that direct taxes
be apportioned .° There is general acceptance of the notion that there
are few, if any, constitutional limitations upon the power of Congress
to tax.
This is probably a good thing. Aside from the common conten-
tion that the people should have the right to use their government in
the way they see fit and the obvious necessity of a strong fiscal arm
in times of crisis, the disappearance of substantial constitutional issues
is further justified by providing more time and energy to consider
what our tax laws should be. When attention is turned in this direc-
tion many approaches are available. For example, the teaching and
techniques of economics are available to attempt a solution of knotty
problems of incidence of the various forms of taxation, the effect of
income, estate and gift taxes upon incentives, the degree of market
4 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
268 U.S. 628 (1925).
7 Id. at 631.
8 Lowndes, Current Constitutional Problems in Federal Taxation, 4 Vand. L. Rev.
469 (1951).
9 United States v. Manufacturers National Bank of Detroit, 365 U.S. 194 (1960).
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distortion caused by tax concessions, limits of taxable capacity and
many others." Those interested in the legislative process can investi-
gate the virtues and limitations of such a process." Procedure, ad-
ministrative and judicial, can be closely scrutinized; brave efforts can
be made to chart courses of passage safe for the timid, through the
turbulent seas of decisions and rulings; 12 and the daring can conceive,
execute, and publish the results of perilous voyages which yielded
rich cargoes.''
And, because tax law is law, jurisprudential speculations would
not appear to be out of place. Yet, here is a curious thing. Specu-
lations of this sort are rare.' 4
 As one reflects upon this, many reasons
suggest themselves as explanations. Although taxation, as my col-
leagues often tell me, is a bore, it has deep emotional roots. These
tend to make clear-headed jurisprudential thinking difficult. Also,
taxation's intimate relationship to sovereignty and power can make
discussion of the nature of law in this context verge on making a
brief for civil disobedience." Most of us instinctively feel that if
there is a place where a "law is law" approach is necessary and proper,
the area of taxation is it. It is better, we appear to think, to conduct
10 A recently published volume which I find very interesting is "Readings in the
Economics of Taxation," American Economic Association (1959). The selections were
made by Richard A. Musgrave and Carl S. Shoup. The recent Tax Revision Com-
pendium, House Ways and Means Committee, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) is, of course,
a fruitful source for discussions of this type.
11 E.g., Surrey, The Congress and the Tax Lobbyist—How Special Tax Provisions
Get Enacted, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1957); Ture, Economics in Taxes: Limitations
on the Use of Anti-Recessionary Tax Policy, 44 Va. L. Rev. 835 (1958).
12 The shelves of the tax law libraries are fairly groaning under the weight of
articles with titles commencing with "How to." Countless similar do-it-yourself pieces
are graced with more imaginative titles.
18 Quite naturally a minimum of publicity is accorded the most daring of tax
exploits. In time, however, the successful ones find their way into the pages of the
journals of the tax world. The A B C transaction for financing mineral property
acquisitions and the "Amos 'n Andy" and Jack Benny capital gains accomplishments
are examples. For an article relating to the realm of our modern aristocracy, the enter-
tainment world, which has some of the aspects of high adventure, see Kragen and
Barton, The Tax Dilemma of the Entertainer, 31 So. Cal. L. Rev. 390 (1958).
14 Occasionally a writer reveals certain fundamental premises which guide his
thinking about tax law. For example, see Lanning, Some Realities of Tax Reform,
Tax Revision Compendium, House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959) Vol. 1, 19. For another article which cuts deeply into certain of the prob-
lems encountered in making "good" tax law, see Cary, Reflections Upon the American
Law Institute Tax Project and the Internal Revenue Code: A Plea for a Moratorium
and Reappraisal, 60 Colum. L. Rev. 259 (1960).
16 An H. Bracken Lee or Eroseana Robinson remind us, however, that some do
feel that under certain circumstances tax laws should not be obeyed. Miss Robinson,
whose disobedience is bottomed upon pacifism, carried her remonstrance to the point
of being imprisoned.
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jurisprudential discussions with respect to matters which lie less
close to the main-springs of public order. Those with leanings to
natural law welcome this avoidance of having to measure their views
against the harsh realities of tax law and administration. Positivists
are prepared to test their views in more demanding situations.
I suspect this estrangement of taxation and jurisprudence is
also fostered by the near maddening complexity of all sophisticated
tax structures. It is much better to discuss the issue of whether a
hypothetical statute employing the term "vehicle" includes a "baby
carriage" than whether the term "securities" in the Internal Revenue
Code includes a promissory note payable in five years." And, al-
though this is more doubtful, many probably believe that there is an
almost arithmetical precision in the tax laws which makes speculation
about the "is" and the "ought" equivalent to an argument about the
"oughtness" of the proposition that two plus two equals four." The
truth of the matter, however, is that tax law, particularly that which
produces large amounts of revenue, raises all the fundamental prob-
lems of jurisprudence. The relationship of means to ends, the sources
of ends, the meaning and types of justice, the nature and sources of
law, the limits of adjudication and administration, the nature of the
interpretive process, all exist in the tax law. Of course, this is no
great revelation. It does, however, provide the background for a
statement of the purpose of this paper.
It would be possible to take any one of the jurisprudential prob-
lems just mentioned and explore it, using tax law as the means of
study. This I do not intend to do, at least not directly. My approach
will be different. The West is committed to the rule of law. In recent
years the challenges and taunts of our enemies have led us to think
10
 See H. L. A. Hart, Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals, 71 Harv.
L. Rev. 593, 606-15 (1958) ; Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—A Reply To Pro-
fessor Hart, 71 Harv: L. Rev. 630, 661-69 (1958), where the meaning of the term
"vehicle" is discussed. Jurisprudential speculation similar to that of Hart and Fuller
is quite applicable to the term "securities" as it is used in the Internal Revenue Code.
Personally I rather doubt that the term has a "hard core" meaning as Professor Hart
suggested it would, although some of the earlier cases interpreting it appear to think
so. For example, in Commissioner v. Neustadt's Trust, 131 F.2d 528 (2d Cir. 1942) the
court, after referring to "common financial parlance" said "A court is justified in
believing that when Congress employs in a tax law words having a well defined mean-
ing in the business world, it used them with that meaning in the absence of clear evi-
dence to the contrary." (530). More helpful is the general interpretive approach in
Griswold, "Securities" and "Continuity of Interest," 58 Harv. L. Rev. 705 (1945).
17 This illusion, and 'a pernicious one it is, is made more prevalent as the tax law
becomes more "accountantized." That is, as law makes greater use of fixed percentages
and other semi-mathematical formulae the more obscure to the casual observer are the
general purposes of the provisions.
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much about the meaning of our commitment. This is good, and there
is no reason why the implications of this commitment to tax law
should not be examined. This is the purpose of this paper. The tax
law employed will be that with which I am most familiar—the federal
income, estate and gift tax law.
There is one difference between the discussion which follows
and the usual discourse upon the rule of law. Most of the latter are
concerned with distilling the essence of the rule of law. The
search appears to be for the minimum characteristics which will
satisfy the commitment. I doubt that this springs from devotion to
Platonic idealism. Rather, it appears to me that this tendency arises
from mounting doubt about the wisdom and practicability of our
commitment. It is difficult to deny that the enemy's presence imposes
a strain upon our institutions which produces its full measure of doubt
and confusion. However, be this as it may, my concern is not with
how bad a tax law can be and still measure up to the minimum de-
mands of the rule of law. Rather, it is with the characteristics which
it should possess to substantially conform to "the rule of good law."
There are essentially three reasons for this emphasis. The first is to
suggest that through our concern with minimum characteristics we
are, I believe, unwisely narrowing the scope of our commitment. The
second is that by considering "the rule of good law" a greater range
of inquiry is possible. While I very much doubt that the content of
"the rule of law" is purely formal and procedural," the insertion of
the adjective "good" eliminates "arguments at the margin." My last
and most important reason is to provide a standard by which we can
determine whether the confidence we are admonished to have in the
national government's use of "the power to destroy" is justified. A
free people are entitled to insist upon such a standard and to with-
draw their confidence in that government when there is no substantial
compliance. But to remain a free people it is necessary to understand
and believe in such a standard. This cannot be over-emphasized. In
18 Professor Jones in The Rule of Law and The Welfare State, 58 Colum. L. Rev.
143, 151 (1958) writes as follows: "Although I, too, think of the concept [the rule of
law] as a primarily procedural one, I am by no means sure that a meaningful rule
of law has nothing whatever to say concerning the substantive content of legally
enforced principles." I rather think Professor Jones was more restrained than he need
have been. The rule of law is for something. Its structure should be shaped by its
purposes. I should think the content of rules emerging from a society purportedly
living under a rule of law will affect the viability of the procedural aspects of the rule
of law. Can a judge long adhere to the standard "good faith" and "high seriousness,"
which Professor Jones regards as an essential aspect of the rule of law, when required
to apply "wicked" laws? I think not. Cf. Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law—.
Reply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630, 644-46 (1958).
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our society, too much afflicted with rule by massive, ponderous blocs,
and threatened as it is from all sides, such belief and understanding
are difficult to preserve and foster. No discussion of this standard can
be entirely superfluous at this point in our history.
II
THE NATURE OF THE RULE OF GOOD LAW
Lord Macmillan once said, in a discussion of what he called "the
reign of law," that "The essence of the law resides in its conformity
with the conscience of humanity."' This also describes good law.
Put somewhat differently, the sovereignty of good law depends upon
substantial agreement by the members of a society with the funda-
mental means and ends of their society. This, standing alone, says
very little, and could mean that the rule of good law merely reflects
society's, to use Santayana's words, "idle escape from one error into
another."2° For its meaning to escape the trap of complete relativism,
it is necessary to posit some important and enduring characteristics
of man. If such exist and are correctly stated, it is then possible to
comprehend "the conscience of humanity" and to understand which
means and ends are likely to enjoy the acquiescence and support of
the members of a society. I believe this can be done.
To say this involves a commitment, and a dangerous one at that
—a commitment because it removes one from the role of the curious
but detached observer of the affairs of men, and dangerous because
the part of the false prophet is the not unlikely alternative.' We
who teach, however, can hardly avoid a commitment of some sort,
nor should we try to do so. This impelling force of our profession
is what makes our lives the dangerous but glorious adventures which
they are.
To me, man is the product of tensions caused by the antinomies
of his nature. Tensions created by internal contradictions are his fate.
His capacity for knowledge and wisdom is limited. In this sense, at
least, he is under God. Thus there can be no definitive compilation
19 Macmillan, The Reign of Law: Western Europe Strives to Re-establish It, 35
A.BA.J. 27 (1949).
20 Santayana, The Realm of Essence 5 (1928).
21- We know of many such prophets and their follies always tempt us to seek the
shelter of passive acceptance of the prevailing mores. We also know of many whose
views appear amazingly durable, and this encourages us to commitment. I believe
Professor Wechsler spoke truth when he observed that we are "united in belief in
norms of right and justice that transcend positive law, yielding criteria—broad as they
are—by which all government and law may properly by judged." Government Under
Law, Harvard Symposium 131 (1956).
•
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of the antinomies of his nature. Although he realizes this, he re-
peatedly attempts the impossible task of understanding himself com-
pletely. His failure is not total, however. Certain predispositions
which constitute some of the conflicting forces can be isolated. Let
me illustrate. Man is predisposed to love; but he is also predisposed
to hate. Both are natural tendencies or propensities. He is inclined
to be generous in giving aid to others; but he is also selfish and
acquisitive. He is social and gregarious; but he also seeks solitude
and apartness. He believes in equality; but he also strives for in-
equality. He is predisposed to worship the portions of his environ-
ment which are beyond his power and understanding; but he strives
to reduce the magnitude of the object of his veneration by enlarging
his power and understanding. He is predisposed to contentment when
he understands the reason and purpose of the institutions which sur-
round him; but faith can bring serenity to him. He tends to aspire
to rule other men; but he also tends to prefer to be ruled by strong
men. He admires objectivity and finds it often accompanies depend-
ence on no single course; but he also admires partisanship and finds
it often accompanies a commitment of all to a single source. He
worships both Dionysus and Apollo. He aspires to be individually
responsible for his destiny; but he also petitions the group for aid in
the attainment of his ends. And, of course, he loves war as well as
peace.
These and other antithetical characteristics shape man's insti-
tutions and the best and most durable of them are those which -permit
temperate expression of such traits and predispositions. Even the
individual suffers when he attempts to lock within himself too many of
these tendencies. He is too much "inner-directed." He becomes, we
say, "warped" and maladjusted. This somewhat Hegelian approach
to the "conscience of humanity" should not be understood to carry
with it a commitment to some form of ultimate synthesis of reason,
nor should it be taken to assert that the balance of these antinomies
is the same in every society. The former is not necessary to the
purpose at hand, and the latter is contrary to common observation.
Some men hate more than they love, seek society more than solitude,
and give faith ascendancy over understanding. The converse is true
of others. So it is with groups of men. Yet in all exists the power of
the negative and disaster follows those who blindly ignore it.
There are a number of consequences of importance in under-
standing the "conscience of humanity" which flow from this view of
the nature of man. The first which I wish to mention is that the aim
of social and political activity should be to design a structure in
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which the human predispositions can, through expression, check or
complement one another so as to assure a temperate, moderate and
tolerable expression of all. For example, the propensity to hate can
be turned on those who love war too well. The inclination to war
can be used to provide the civil order and security which is needed.
The desire for inequality can provide the initiative and leadership
necessary for society. The necessity to love can, as perhaps Orwell
pointed out, check the will to rule. The compulsion to worship can
ameliorate selfishness and greed. The examples can be multiplied,
but the point is clear. Virtues and vices have their function; that is,
to produce a moderate expression of the attributes of human nature.
In religious terms the problem concerns the role of sin. God, in
Martin Luther's words, says to the Devil, "Devil thou art a murderer
and a criminal, but I will use thee for whatsoever I will. Thou shall
be the dung with which I will fertilize my lovely vineyard. I will and
can use thee in my work on my vines. . . .7)22 My first consequence
can not be put more beautifully.
A second consequence, of equal importance with the first, is that
the employment of means to accomplish one or more of man's aspira-
tions will generate circumstances which tend to prevent the attainment
of others. This usually unintended frustration of the latter increases
in severity as the yearning for the former intensifies and as more and
more devices are mobilized for its realization. Another way of putting
this is to say that the more completely we seek a certain end the
greater the price we must pay in the form of forsaking other ends.
As a result the single-minded, highly-concentrated drive toward a
single, fairly concrete objective will be rewarded with an unexpected
amalgam of success and failure. This is the source of much of human
tragedy, and the operation of this grim law never fails to stir us with
bitterness and anguish. "Why is the good so elusive?" we wail, for-
getting that the answer lies within our own being. This consequence,
the fact that a defeat always accompanies a victory, should operate
as a restraint upon too intense pursuit of somewhat narrow, rationally
enunciated, purposes. Such pursuit confuses what we think we want
with what we do, in fact, want, viz., the more or less balanced and
moderate expression of our antithetical selves.
Third, it follows that there is no perfect solution to our problems
because the manners in which this balance can be struck are multi-
tudinous, if not infinite. Frank Knight recently put the point this
way: "The Good means the better; there is no such thing as a
22 Quoted by Herman Obendiek, Der Tuefel bei Martin Luther.
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meaningful ideal of perfection." 28 Our striving for, joined with the
unattainability of, perfection is itself a source of great tension. Only
the wise do not despair when it is realized that the true ends are never
attained but only approached.
Fourth, it is obvious that there will be endless experimentation
by man in his effort to create the institutions which will afford the
most satisfactory expression of himself. He is doomed to "ever be-
coming," but never "to become." It does not follow, however, that
any change is as good as another. The criterion for judgement is the
extent to which the experimentation gives fair promise to bring about
a better environment for the moderate expression of man's antithetical
being. There is much room for difference of opinion when a proposed
change is measured against this criterion, and this leads to the fifth
consequence of my view of the nature of man.
It is that tolerance of these differences of opinion is imperative
to prevent a strait-jacketing of society which is so contrary to man's
nature that it will produce its opposite reaction of violence and dis-
order. Yet, to me at least, this necessity of tolerance does not require
acquiescence to the demands of those who unqualifiedly deny what I
am describing as the nature of man. To acquiesce would constitute a
denial of my basic premises and make me untrue to myself. Those
who, in the name of tolerance, ask me to do this ask for too much. To
these demands I am obligated to be intolerant. This is a mantle of
responsibility which accompanies commitment. As stated earlier, the
possibility of error is ever present; but life demands risks.
Assuming some of the fundamental characteristics of man have
been described with a fair degree of accuracy, and that the afore-
mentioned consequences are correctly deduced therefrom, I believe
there emerges a basis for substantial agreement about the content of
the rule of good law. There are, of course, a number of ways in which
this can be described. My preference is to state three purposes which
should be served by the legal, political and social structure of any
good society. The first of these is to afford the protection, only in
the last analysis supplied by arms, from those bent on destruction
necessary to permit the essential work of life to be done. The brigand
and the barbarian must be held in check. The second is to provide
and maintain the climate favorable for purposeful thought and dis-
cussion and the ability to act upon its basis. All need not be per-
mitted to share in this process; but it is equally clear that a "favor-
able climate" is inconsistent with all such thought and action being
23 Knight, Intelligence and Democratic Action 131 (1960).
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the result of the will of one. Some substantial interchange of views
and sharing of decisions and actions is essential.
Finally, the institutions of a good society ought to create the
conditions which afford the balance of what Lewis Mumford has
called "the processes of individuation and socialization"' which is in
keeping with the benign balance of the contradictions of human
nature, generally favored by the group. Freedom and subjugation,
status and contract, Gerneinschaft and Gesellschaft,' liberty and
security, apartness and togetherness, all must be mixed in a manner
which fully recognizes the tension of life and roughly corresponds to
that desired by the group. Put another way, the chains in which
Rousseau always found man can be lengthened and made lighter; but
they can never be removed, nor should we try to do so. Their removal
produces alienation and perhaps anarchy; but a completely shackled
society stunts its own growth as well as that of its members. The
dual standard—conformity to the nature of man and his desires--is
necessary because the proper balance, as stated before, can be
achieved through many different combinations of institutions.
Many of our modern problems, if an aside be permitted, appear
to stem from a rejection, at least in part, of the nature of man as a
standard and too warm an embrace of our desires as the sole measure
of goodness. Modern man, as Reinhold Niebuhr has pointed out, tends
to find security and ultimate meaning in the "supposedly increasing
values of human cooperation,"" but the danger encountered by this
approach is the trituration of society and the destruction of the
"process of individuation." We are attempting to sculpt our society
without viewing from all sides our model—man and his nature. While
it is true that modern man feels the icy-fingered clutch of estrange-
ment from his surroundings, our compensatory pursuit of a kind of
collective hedonism has led us to ignore many of the contradictions
and conflicts within the nature of man and to romanticize our accom-
plishments beyond all reason. The corrective of a more critical atti-
tude toward ourselves and, perhaps, a good measure of pessimism is
long overdue. Fortunately, there are promising signs of their emer-
gence. Our immediate problem, however, is how well our existing
federal income, estate and gift taxes conform to the three purposes
which should be served by our legal, political and social structure.
24 Mumford, The Human Prospect 184 (1955).
25 The reference is to the title of a book by Ferdinand Tonnies. It has been
translated by C. P. Loomis. See Community & Association (Gemeinschaft and Ges-
ellschaft) (1955).
26 Neibuhr, An Interpretation of Christian Ethics 16 (1958).
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Before turning to this measurement, a fundamental question
affecting the validity of the structure of my analysis must be dealt
with. The question is this. Assuming the three purposes served by
the rule of good law provide satisfactory criteria for judging society
as a whole, do they have any particular utility to the task of determin-
ing the goodness of a particular body of law, or human institution,
such as federal taxation? A negative answer is suggested when one
attempts to relate the almost trivial character of a single legal rule
to the nearly cosmic nature of the three purposes served by the rule
of good law. How, for example, can it be determined by using this
sort of grand measuring device whether the rule is a good one which
makes acceptance effective upon dispatch of a properly posted assent?
Obviously the calipers I am suggesting here are not made for measur-
ing the goodness of such a rule. Yet they can be made to do such
unnatural work. Is it not true that the rule making acceptance effec-
tive upon dispatch, together with the cognate rule making revocation
of the offer effective upon receipt, is justified by the encouragement
it provides the offeree to rely upon the promise at a time earlier than
certain other rules would permit? If this is so, why should we en-
courage this reliance? Is it to strengthen the legal and economic
institution of contract? If so, why should this be, done? Is it because
this institution is a source of order which serves some of the purposes
of the rule of good law? If so, which ones? Thus, with a somewhat
labored effort can the calipers measure to some extent the merit of a
single rule.
This demonstration, however, does not entirely meet the point
of the question, because it suggests that the institution of contract
does not, and cannot, fully serve all the purposes of the rule of good
law. It cannot, for example, provide the status which is necessary
in a good society. It must play its part in the rule of good law but
it is not the entire cast. How then is federal taxation different? Does
it not also play only one role among many? The answer must be a
qualified one. Its function and scope are limited; but its structure
reveals many of the dominant features of our society. This comes
about because the heavy revenue burden supported by the tax struc-
ture in recent years has served to impress upon it the outlines of our
society and, in turn, the shape of the tax structure has left its mark
upon our society. Thus, there is an interaction between our social
and tax structures which justifies the use of calipers grand enough
to measure our entire society. It is true, as I shall point out in clos-
ing, that it would be wise to maintain, and perhaps further restrict,
the limited function and scope of these taxes; but in our time the
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revenue demands will never sufficiently abate to eliminate the fairly
extensive interaction which is the justification for my approach. It
is to life, not death, that taxes are more closely related.
III
THE EXTENT OF CONFORMITY OF FEDERAL TAXATION TO
THE RULE OF GOOD LAW
The approach which reflection has Ied me to adopt to illustrate
the degree to which the present federal tax structure conforms to
the rule of good law is one which should have been immediately
obvious. It is first to demonstrate the characteristics of this structure
which suggest conformity, and then those which do not. This will
highlight an important feature of this structure, i.e., that it does not,
in many significant respects, probably increasing in number, conform
to the rule of good law. In view of what has been said about the
relationship between the tax structure and society it should not be
surprising or particularly alarming that the federal tax structure
should embody some not-so-good and bad law. It is disturbing, how-
ever, to observe that the quantity of this type of law appears to be
growing. The predominant motion of the federal tax law, in my
opinion, is in the wrong direction and this is a matter for serious
concern.
But first the real and significant contributions to the rule of good
law made by the federal tax system should be set forth. Its contri-
bution to protection from the incursions of those who threaten to
disturb the peace is obvious. The net receipts from all sources for the
fiscal year 1959 was sixty-eight billion." Expenditures for major
national security in this period were something over forty-six billion.'
The aggregate sum expended for this purpose in fiscal year 1960 de-
clined very slightly." Since the receipts in the fiscal year of 1959
from the three taxes with which we are concerned (income, estate and
gift) were over fifty-five billion," it is apparent that their contribution
to the preservation of order was enormous. The income tax, particu-
larly, produces an enormous volume of revenue and serves this cause
admirably." These evident truths cannot be restated too frequently.
27 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for the Fiscal Year Ended
June 30, 1959, 372.
28 Id. at 15.
29 Surrey and Warren, Federal Income Taxation 36 (1960).
30 Annual Report of the Secretary of the Treasury for the Fiscal Year Ended
June 30, 1959, 7-9.
31 In fiscal year 1960 the individual income tax was estimated to produce a net
yield of $40.3 billion. The estimated yield of the corporation income tax was $22.2
billion. Surrey and Warren, op. cit. supra note 29.
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However, it is certainly theoretically possible to conceive of
the same, or greater, volume of revenue being produced by a tax
resembling a sales tax and this, in turn, requires the question whether
these three taxes conform to the rule of good law in a way in which a
sales tax would not. It is conventional wisdom, to borrow a term from
Galbraith, to think that they do; and in this instance conventional
wisdom probably speaks truthfully. Three features, one of which is
applicable only to the income tax, lead me to this view. These are the
progression of rates, the self-assessment system, and the withholding
procedure_
Progression contributes substantially to the rule of good law in
a manner in which the sales tax could not. This comes about because
of the major purpose served by progression, viz., the reduction of
inequality. Blum and Kalven have demonstrated to my satisfaction
that this is the most persuasive justification for progression which
exists.' Other theories, such as the greater benefit, equal or minimum
sacrifice on the assumption of some decline in the utility of money,
ability to pay, and the nature of compensatory economics, do not so
adequately establish the firm foundation which progression requires."
The first means by which progression reduces inequality is obvious.
It takes progressively more money from the rich than it does from the
poor. The decline in the percentage of disposable income in the hands
of the rich in recent years34
 indicates that it has had some effect even
though it would be improper to conclude that the entire decline is
attributable to progression. Other forces have also been at work, such
as the still growing control of the labor market by labor organizations,
the professionalization of management and its partial severance from
the families whose ancestors founded the enterprises, the public's
distaste for "large" profits being reaped by "established" corporations,
the power of the farmer and other reasonably large "needy" groups,
and the outpouring of funds to other nations hopefully designed to
serve the dual interests of humanity and national survival. The
opinion that the rich should not be coddled by government is a view
held by most and its implementation takes many forms. Only in the
newer parts of the nation are the rich clothed with some of the tattered
fragments of the mantle of legitimacy which it was once their proud
honor to wear.
Progression serves the interest of less inequality in another and
more subtle way. It is widely, recognized by those more than casually
32 Blum and Kalven, The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation (1953).
33
 Ibid.
34 Galbraith, The Affluent Society 85-87 (1958).
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acquainted with our tax structure that the rate tables in the Code
bear little resemblance to the actual rate of progression at which
income, particularly, is taxed.' However, I suspect that this fact is
not widely known 3° and that this ignorance, joined with the knowledge
that an income tax exists about which the rich are constantly com-
plaining, leads many to the satisfying conclusion that the rich are
bearing a greater burden than they do. This illusion brings repose
and, as will be made clear in a moment, serves some of the same
purposes which would be served by reality.
To understand how this illusion may, in fact, serve the same ends
as would reality, it is necessary to examine how the reduction of in-
equality tends to conform to the purposes of the rule of good law.
To do this adequately a few observations about the nature of the
appeal of lessened inequality will be helpful. 37 As should be expected,
the sources of such an appeal are both noble and ignoble. Envy and
covetousness generate a substantial portion of this attraction; but it is
also true, as Jerome Hall" and others have pointed out, that equality
is a major portion of the democratic ideal. Indeed, it does not widely
miss the mark to say that in democracy the tendency is to make the
guide "to each equally" the general rule and impose a fairly heavy
burden of proof upon those seeking to create or legitimate a variant.
This burden, however, is always lightened to some extent by our
somewhat contradictory commitment to another democratic ideal—
liberty." The synthesis of these ideals is the day to day work of a
democratic regime. DeTocqueville long ago traced with brilliant
prescience many of the means by which the democratic ideal of
equality would be worked pure in our society.
38 Many authorities have made this point. For a recent and terse restatement of
the point see Surrey, The Federal Income Tax Base for Individuals, in Tax Revision
Compendium, House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., Ist Sess. (1959)
Vol. 1, 1.
38 My feeling is based primarily on the absence of public concern about the matter.
While the new Administration may move against selected targets in the tax law, there
appears presently little pressure for the comprehensive revision which would be neces-
sary to make the rates realistic. One investigation indicates that people tend to approve
the status quo in distributing the tax burden whatever that happens to be. Blum,
Some Off-Center Observations About Our Tax System, N.Y.13. 16th Tax Inst. 1, 4 (1958).
37 In Blum, supra note 36, it is indicated that most people do not think of pro-
gression as a contributor to a redistribution of income but rather base their approval
on an ability-to-pay slogan. While this may be true, just as it is true that there has
been a decline in interest in equalitarianism as a political goal, I seriously doubt that
the appeal of lessened inequality has vanished. To some extent it is passive, and to
some extent it is spending itself in the area of civil rights, but its presence I do not
doubt.
38 Living Law of Democratic Society 98, 99 {1949).
39 See Friedman, Law in a Changing Society 491 (1959).
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An aspect of the democratic ideal of equality which, I believe,
throws additional light upon the appeal of lessened inequality is
that in the minds of many the ideal of equality serves to hold in
check "the human tendency to evil") that would too abundantly
flourish in its absence. In more politically oriented terms, lessened
inequality tends to assure a more extensive dispersion of power and
to minimize the opportunity for massive misrule.
There is another source of the appeal of lessened inequality which
is in truth a legacy of Marx. The logic of the capitalist structure was
to Marx inconsistent with its survival. The seizure by the bourgeoisie
of the surplus value created by labor would in time destroy the sys-
tem through revolution. To those not prepared to fully accept this
apocalyptical version of history, but nonetheless impressed, as one
properly may be, with Marx's emphasis upon the importance to
social institutions of the manner in which production is organized
and with the grandeur of his synthesis, some redistribution of income,
perhaps, would seem to avert the disaster he foretold. However, those
who view the reduction of inequality as a tribute to be paid to the
ghost of Marx are always acutely aware, as Galbraith has put it,"
of the whisper of the Marxists that it is not enough. The intensity
and persistence of this whisper lead many to see in progression a
symbol of the means of capitalism's escape from the grim jaws of,
Marxian disaster and never to be satisfied quite completely with a
rate structure which can be increased.
The ghost of Marx, however, is not the only shade to strengthen
the appeal of diminished inequality. Another is Keynes. His macro-
economic views, which altered substantially the previously assumed
roles of savings and consumption in the economy, clearly suggest not
only a means of narrowing the gap between the rich and the poor,
by moving funds from idle stocks of money to sectors of the economy
where a high propensity to consume exists, but also a means by which
all can move to a higher but more flat plateau of plenty. So viewed,
resistance to the diminution of inequality is equivalent to the attitude
of the dog in the manger.
An often neglected source of the appeal of reduced inequality
is simply that it approaches the ideal of equality which, in turn, rests
some measure of its appeal on its apparent simplicity. How often in
searching for criteria by which to apportion the goods and perquisites
40 See a very interesting statement of what might be called "fundamental
liberalism" in Adams, The Liberal View of Man and Society, 11 The Carolina Quarterly
30 (1958).
41 Galbraith, supra note 34, at 82.
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which come within our control as individuals do we solve our problem
by an equal division! And this is done even though we recognize the
possibility of having perpetuated inequality by awarding equal shares
to unequals. The equality of shares, however, carries with it a pre-
sumption of fairness, one might say, which makes criticism appear
churlish and mean. This is a truth of which administrators, legislators,
estate planners and parents have long been aware. So it is that "to
each equally" draws support because of its simplicity, albeit this is
somewhat specious, and, in turn, furnishes persuasive force for the
reduction of inequality.
And, finally, Christianity has encouraged the belief that differ-
ences in the station in life between people are transitory things and
that all are equal before God. Not unnaturally such views operate as
a deep reservoir of conviction from which flow designs whereby God's
promise can be redeemed on earth. Michael Polanyi recently has set
forth very clearly how the tension between Christian precepts and
existing society can generate an intensely fanatical desire to sweep
away existing injustices and even lead to the establishment of "moral
supermen" who acknowledge no moral restraints whatsoever. 42 Even
when passions do not reach this pitch, the steady tug of Christian
beliefs produces a preference for reduced inequality.
These, then, are at least some of the sources of the appeal for
lessened inequality. It now should be clear how such shrinkage of
the area between the rich and the poor tends to consistency with the
purposes of the rule of good law. The interest of civil order, for
example, is served by giving controlled expression to covetousness
and envy. To the extent that some are lifted by the process of
shrinkage there comes into being an opportunity for their greater
participation in the formulation of decisions and in the actions which
ensue. There is, it is believed, a greater sharing of many of "the
things that count." In addition, a device such as progression directed
to reducing inequality gives some modest assurance to the poor that
they have not been forgotten and,• although this can hardly induce
an attitude of serenity comparable to that of the fowls of the air or
the lilies of the field, it does furnish some security and sense of be-
longing which must exist in a substantial measure in every healthy
society. I do not wish to over-emphasize this aspect of progression,
however, because its contribution is, at best, cold, impersonal and
somewhat capricious. On the other hand, progression, so long as its
rates do not equal 100%, does permit some reward to the rich and
42 Beyond Nihilism, 14 Encounter 35 (1960).
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thus leaves intact some inducement to the individual to better his
economic position. In short, progression itself reflects an effort to
balance, to return to Mumford's phrase, "the processes of individu-
ation and socialization." Finally, the contribution which the illusion
mentioned earlier, respecting the burden carried by the rich, makes
to the purposes of the rule of good law is simply that it assuages the
envy and fosters the sense of security of those who share it.'
The second feature of the federal taxes with which we are con-
cerned which demonstrates the superiority of their conformity to the
rule of good law over that of sales taxes is, as noted, the self-assess-
ment system. This superiority flows from the opportunity it provides
for extensive participation in what is essentially a governmental act.
This participation substantially contributes to the creation and main-
tenance of an atmosphere favorable to productive thought and dis-
cussion about both the sources of governmental revenue and the
nature of its expenditures. A sales tax, exacting its toll amidst the
bustle and haste of the market place and, as often as not, partially
concealed from the immediate bearer of its burden, cannot make such
a contribution. It is ancient republican dogma that the best govern-
ment is one in which the governors and the governed frequently
exchange their positions.'" To a significant extent the self-assessment
system makes this possible.
This sharing of governmental responsibility under these tax laws,
involving as it does countless man-hours of thought, computation and
instruction, brings to the awareness of many the fundamental truth
that democracy requires responsible citizens. What better exercise
to understand the full force of Kant's categorical imperative can there
be than when one weighs the merits of excluding an item of income
or claiming a deduction which is not proper but which is not too
likely to be caught by any possible audit? Even when the decision
goes against the government, which means against our fellow citizens,
we are aware of our departure from a high ethical standard and pro-
ceed to find our solace in the baser norm of conformity to what we
have reason to believe is the general conduct of others similarly
situated. I suspect more persons dimly perceive, at least, that this
43 Recognition of the occasional beneficence of illusions should not obscure the
cost their use entails. See p. 232 infra. However, no society can dispel all its illusions,
even assuming that the epistemological problem of what constitutes an illusion is
resolved.
44 George Sabine points out how this "device of statecraft" was considered ex-
tremely important in the republicanism of both Machiavelli and Harrington. A History
of Political Theory 347, 504 (rev. ed. 1951).
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norm cannot assure responsible citizenship because it condones con-
formity to irresponsibility. Thus, we frequently are made aware that,
to use a term badly overworked and carrying a. gloss of scientism
which tends to obscure its human and personal aspects, the democratic
process must be more than an ever-shifting complex of compromises
between individuals, groups and factions each predominantly bent on
imposing its selfishly-oriented will on the other. This is training in
citizenship of a fairly high order, equal in value, if not superior, to
the exercise of the franchise.
It may appear inconsistent with what has been said to assert
now that the withholding procedure under the income tax law also
conforms to the criterion of the rule of good law to a significant
extent. And to a large extent this appearance is real. It does elimi-
nate, or at best dilute, the training in citizenship which self-assessment
imposes. More about this will be said later. There is, however, an-
other side to withholding which upholds the rule of good law. I do
not refer to the fact that it assures the volume of revenue desired
because this would not distinguish it from a sales tax. Rather, the
thought is that by shifting at least a portion of the assessing and
remittance burden from the individual employee to his employer a
small bit is contributed to the development of a sense of community
between them. To a certain extent one cannot escape a feeling of
"belonging" when the eye travels over the voucher which often
accompanies the pay check and notes the provisions for the present
and future that are being made for him through the employer. "Be-
longing," of course, can be turned easily into dependence and sub-
servience, but employer indifference to the welfare of the employee
does increase the sense of alienation which is so prevalent in our time.
To sum up, the income, estate and gift taxes conform to the
rule of good law because of their revenue producing capacity. In
addition, they possess three characteristics (progression, self-assess-
ment and withholding) which make them superior to a sales tax
producing the equivalent amount of revenue. These three taxes, how-
ever, are in accord with our criterion of the rule of good law in an-
other way which should not be presented in contrast to the sales tax.
The third purpose to be served by good law—to balance the interests
of the individual and the group—achieves its end it will be recalled,
by satisfying the dual standard of the nature of man and his desires.
I believe these taxes substantially correspond to our desires about the
proper balance between the two. This view is justified by observing
how the structure of these taxes mirrors some prominent features of
our social and economic life.
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Let me develop this point. In the first place the taxes are
designed for a money economy in which the market plays a paramount
role, and our economy tends in this direction. The imputed income
problem, perhaps best brought to focus by the dextrous do-it-yourself
taxpayer who builds or repairs his own home or the hardy self-reliant
farmer who produces a substantial part of what he consumes, illus-
trates that a society becomes more suitable for the income tax as it
moves from status, in which the attributes of such are seldom a matter
of bargain and sale, to contract, in which there is marked division of
labor and the goods and services required by life are purchased from
specialists. Although perhaps inherently less so, the estate and gift
tax are similarly dependent upon a money-exchange economy because
their base is computed by using "fair market values."
Another way in which the income tax, particularly, matches the
social fabric we and our forebears have woven is that it is a tax only
suitable for a people who closely calculate their economic position
and keep detailed records. Schumpeter has drawn our attention to
the fact that double entry bookkeeping is a "towering monument"
to the rationalism of "capitalist practice."" A highly developed sys-
tem of accounting is also a necessary technical precursor to the income
tax. The mind and will of a calculating, record-keeping people is
what Ferdinand Tonnies described as Kurwille"—a cautious men-
tality which prudently weighs the advantages and disadvantages of
the available courses of action. Such a people are inclined toward a
balance between status and contract which tends to favor the latter.
Hence, we, as such a people, have selected a means of levying and
collecting taxes which fits our notions of the proper balance, and in
so doing have served the interests of the rule of good law.
Indeed our tax system has accentuated our inclination toward
the type of rational mentality which functions best in capitalism.
The tax factor in all family and business arrangements introduces
an element which calls for mathematical evaluation of a multitude
of eventualities. For example, in estate planning what is the effect of
a family death in advance of the period of life expectancy upon
aggregate death duties?'" Or, again in estate planning, what portion
45 Schumpter, Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy 123 (3d ed. 19W).
46 See note 25 supra.
47 Premature death may lessen the amount of death taxes, as where the husband
dies prior to reaching his full wealth producing capacity, or it may increase them, as
where the wife who survives her husband fails to reach her expectancy and thus leaves
unconsumed a portion of the husband's estate which it had been thought would be
necessary for her maintenance. Many assumptions, such as earning capacity of the
assets in the estate, the standard of living of the person involved, the probable level
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of the marital deduction will achieve the greatest tax saving under
various assumptions as to the time of death of the spouse and chil-
dren? 48
 Or what is the effect on death duties of property held jointly
as compared to that held by tenancy in common?" The tax factor
also gives what can be called an added dimension to many business
transactions which transforms what would be losses according to
ordinary commercial calculations into gains. This enhances the
sporting element which to some extent colors the conduct of business
affairs. It requires a fairly high degree of commercial sophistication
to grasp the fact that the tax factor can make the gift of property a
profitable venture," the exchange of entrepreneurial status for that
of taxes during the ensuing decade or so, and the general level of business and govern-
ment activity, are employed in the calculation of the effect of premature death on
death duties. The point is that the tax system creates a pressure to engage in dose
calculation of the consequences of a number of eventualities. It would make an
interesting study to examine many estate plans after their main objects have been
either served or frustrated to determine the general level of accuracy of the many
assumptions which went into their formulation.
48
 The starting point in planning the use of the marital deduction, a deduction
roughly equal to one half of the estate of a decedent spouse after deductions for certain
debts and expenses, is to employ it in a manner which will result in the division of
the aggregate estate of the spouses into two equal parts with the estate tax imposed on
each part separately. Generally this will produce the minimum effective rate of tax
on the aggregate estate. To achieve this equal division it will be necessary for the
spouse with the larger estate to employ less than the full marital deduction because
the maximum deduction would make the estate of the surviving spouse larger than
that of the decedent spouse. This may not be wise, however, if the surviving spouse
is expected to live for a substantial period of time. Under such circumstances there may
be the opportunity for disposing of the assets, received from the decedent spouse by
way of a bequest which qualified for the marital deduction, by means of gifts to the
children which will escape tax or be taxed at the lower gift tax rate. Some nice
calculations combining the exact science of mathematics and the not-so-exact science
of medicine become necessary.
48 Many complex tax questions arise from the use of joint tenancies and tenancies
by the entirety. The one referred to in the text involves the marital deduction. See
note 48 supra. Where the spouses own property in equal shares as tenants in common,
upon the death of one spouse survived by the other it is possible for three fourths of
the total value of the property to be relieved of death duties at that time. On the
other hand, upon the death of one spouse survived by the other only one half of
jointly held property acquired with consideration furnished solely by the decedent
spouse will escape such death ditties. This advantage of the tenancy in common
possibly is reduced by the fact that jointly held property may acquire a "stepped-up"
basis for income tax purposes. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1014(b)(9). See generally
Rudick, Federal Tax Problems Relating to Property Owned in Joint Tenancy and
Tenancy by the Entirety, 4 Tax. L. Rev. 3 (1948).
88
 For some tables computed under the Revenue Act of 1951 which illustrate the
"in-pocket" gain from a charitable gift of property which has appreciated in value
by taxpayers subject to certain marginal rates, see Seidman, Save By Giving, 30 Taxes
338 (1952). The formula for determining when a donor is better off by giving the
property away to charity than by selling the property and keeping the proceeds after
taxes is set forth in Griswold, Federal Taxation 429 (5th ed. 1960). It is as follows:
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of a salaried consultant the producer of profit and philanthropy
simultaneously,' the creation of rather functionless corporations
joined with carefully drawn conveyances of mineral property an often
profitable substitute for a mortgage," and the investment of borrowed
funds in certain assets, ranging from bonds to bovines, and their sale
at an apparent loss, produce a profit." Truly it can be said that the
Cash McCalls are direct descendants of the Forsytes.
.25
The Value of the property must exceed Basis 
X Donor's top tax rate
Minus .75
(The formula assumes a maximum capital gains tax rate of 25%.)
For additional tables more recent than those of Seidman's, see Penick, Tax Economics
of Charitable Giving, 38 Taxes 111 (1960).
51 The type of transaction referred to takes several forms. However, the general
pattern is for the owner of a business to sell to an exempt organization with payment
to be made over a period of time from the income of the business. The operation of
the business may be through a "feeder corporation" or under some lease arrangement
which will avoid the pitfalls of the Code's provisions taxing the unrelated business
income of certain exempt organizations. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 511-15. The seller
will serve as a manager of, or consultant for, the business so transferred. The tide of
the decisions appears to be running in favor of such devices when carefully designed.
See Ohio Furnace Co., 25 T.C. 179 (1955). Compare A. Shiffman, 32 T.C. 1073
(1959) (A). But see Kolkey, 27 T.C. 37 (1956), aff'd, 254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958).
The Revenue Service views this sort of device with some skepticism. Rev. Rul. 54-420,
1954 - 2 C.B. 128. For general discussions see Grant, Taxation of Exempt Charitable
Organizations Engaging in Business Activities, 4 U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 352 (1957);
MacCracken, Selling a Business to a Charitable Foundation, U. So. Cat. 1954 Tax.
Inst. 205.
52 The reference is to a transaction known to the mineral industry as the "A B C
deal." A vendor of producing mineral property conveys the property to a corporation
formed to assist the financing of the purchase of the property by the vendee. This
corporation pays the vendor the full purchase price from funds borrowed from a bank
for that purpose. The property is then transferred to the vendee with the corporate
transferor reserving a production payment roughly equal to the deferred payments
plus interest which the vendee has agreed to make. The down payment is made by
the vendee to the corporate transferor and the amount of the loan by the bank is
reduced by that amount. The same result can be reached more directly by means of
a transfer of the property by the vendor directly to the vendee with the appropriate
production payment reserved which is then sold by the vendor to the corporation
assisting the financing. The holding of the production payment by the corporation, the
"C" in the "A B C" designation, which entitles it to a certain share of mineral production,
serves the function of a device to secure repayment of the funds used to satisfy the
purchase price paid the vendor. For a comparison of the "A B C deal" with a
straight purchase secured by a mortgage see Wilkinson, A B C—From A to Z, 38 Tex.
L. Rev. 673 (1960). See also Appleman, The A B C Deal, 11 Institute on Oil and Gas
Law and Taxation 519 (1960).
53 The essence of these devices is to borrow funds to finance the acquisition of
certain assets, obtain a tax deduction for the interest payments required by the loan,
and have the profit of the transaction be taxed at capital gains rates or escape tax
completely. Thus, dollars costing 200 after taxes, for example, can yield a return of
750 after taxes. With such a spread the return of fewer dollars than sent forth may
still leave a comfortable profit. Both cattle, which is breeding stock, and securities
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Our system of bargain and exchange guided by rational and more
or less informed self interest is mirrored in our tax structure in other
ways. One of these, although some will certainly disagree with my
way of presenting this aspect, is that it extends benefits in exchange
for fairly specific prices to be paid by the taxpayers. For example,
everyone who has engaged in tax planning which has as its end the
multiplication of taxpayers to shorten the reach of progression recog-
nizes full well the importance of drilling the client on the things which
he must do to gain this benefit. In using multiple corporations, to
take one instance, the price of maintaining precise records, observing
corporate formalities meticulously, employing separate personnel, and
incurring some commercial risk distinguishable from that of the
related corporations are presented to the client as a part of the price
he must pay. 54 This cost is then measured against the "return" from
have been employed as the vehicle for playing the spread caused by the difference be-
tween ordinary income and capital gains rates. In recent months a number of cases
involving securities, as well as certain annuity contracts, have been before the courts.
E.g., Goodstein v. Com'r, 267 F.2d 127 (1st Cir. 1959) (interest payments to finance
acquisition of government securities not deductible); Lynch v. Com'r, 273 F.2d 867
(2d Cir. 1959) (interest payments not deductible because transaction did not create
a debt). The taxpayer won a victory in the Tax Court. See Lee Stanton v. Com'r,
34 T.C. — No. 1 (1960) (interest deductible where taxpayer had some expectation
of a profit aside from that produced through the operation of the tax laws). The
Supreme Court has acted in the single premium annuity bond cases, Knetsch v. United
States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960), resolving a conflict between the Fifth Circuit's view appear-
ing in United States v. Bond, 258 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1958) and that of the Ninth Circuit
in Knetsch v. United States, 272 F.2d 200 (9th Cir. 1959). The Supreme Court denied the
interest deduction in a transaction in which the taxpayer made large "interest payments"
on an annuity contract and then "borrowed" almost the entire amount by which the loan
value of the contract exceeded the "debt" of the taxpayer. Such "borrowings" were some-
what less in amount than the "interest payments." Presumably this difference was to be
recouped through tax savings resulting from "interest deductions" and other tax intricacies.
The Court considered the transaction a "sham." Mr. Justice Brennan, speaking for the
'majority, said, "For it is patent that there was nothing of substance to be realized by
Knetsch from this transaction beyond a tax deduction." (366) Does this mean that
something of "substance" must be realized before a deduction for interest is allowable?
Or does this mean only that the realization of something of "substance" must have been
a substantial motive of the transaction? What is something of "substance"? Mr.
Justice Douglas in dissenting distinguished the transaction before the Court from one
which was merely "hocus-pocus." What is mere "hocus-pocus"? Is it distinguishable
from a fraudulent return? Mr. Justice Douglas also pointed out that the transaction
was not a "sham" in respect to the issuer of the annuity contract. His profit was
taxable. Does this mean that there is a notion of "divisible sham" in the tax law?
54
 Perhaps a lesser cost will suffice in some instances, but the outlook is inflationary.
See James Realty Co. v. United States, 280 F.2d 394 (8th Cir. 1960); Aldan Homes, Inc.,
33 T.C. 582 (1959). The literature on multiple corporations is growing rapidly. A good
recent collection of this literature may be found in footnote 3 in Strecker, Multiple
Corporations, 2 Corp. Pract. Commentator 1 (1960). For a good summary of the
advantages and disadvantages of multiple corporations, including the costs mentioned
in the text, see Driscoll, Incorporating, in Multi-Corporate Form, An Existing Business,
N. Y. U. 16th Tax Inst. 243 (1958)..
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the benefit and, in keeping with the Marshallian curves illustrating
the functional relation between supply and demand, the client tends
to maximize his "return" by acquiring benefits up to the point where
their cost equals their "return."' The Treasury and the Revenue
Service, on the other hand, are in the position of a quite perverse
storekeeper; they attempt to set the price of their stock of benefits
at a level which will remove none of them from their shelves." Need-
less to say their perversity has more often than not been overriden
by the more conventional merchandising instincts of their ultimate
superiors--the taxpayers themselves acting through Congress." In
addition, a uniform price, generally assumed to constitute proper
pricing," quite often does not deter the high-bracket purchaser for
whom the benefit has great utility.
55 Reform measures in the multiple corporation area are generally directed toward
increasing the cost of the benefits sought. See American Law Institute, Income Tax
Problems of Corporations and Shareholders, Report of Working Views of a Study by
the American Law Institute Staff and American Bar Association Section of Taxation
Liaison Committee (1958), wherein it is proposed that a brother-sister group be treated
as a unit where there is a certain degree of common stockholder ownership and the
operations of the group are conducted in an integrated manner. The cost is, therefore,
a diffusion of control and operation in what may be an uneconomic fashion.
56 The estate tax illustrates this "perversity" extremely well. The benefit of
exclusion of property from the gross estate of the decedent carries a fairly high price.
State Street Trust Co. v. United States, 263 F.2d 635 (1st Cir. 1959) • underscores again
the truth that a decedent can obtain this benefit only by divesting himself of any
appreciable interest in the property and any significant discretionary power to control
its beneficial enjoyment. The price may prove injurious to the interests of the dece-
dent's beneficiaries, but this merely serves to protect further the stock of benefits from
future would be purchasers. For example, in State Street Trust Co. it was made clear
that the decedent should either give up being a co-trustee or suffer the imposition of
restraints upon his powers as co-trustee, including his investment powers, which would
constitute a "determinable standard" under Jennings v. Smith, 161 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.
1947). That the price paid by the decedent often enriches the institutional fiduciary is
usually overlooked.
57 A fairly dramatic example occurred in the estate tax area. In Spiegel's Estate v.
Com'r, 335 U.S. 701 (1949), the Court determined that retention of a remote re-
versionary interest by a decedent in property transferred during life, under terms
which made possession and enjoyment by the grantees dependant upon surviving the
grantor, would bring the entire property within the gross estate of the decedent. At
the same time in Com'r v. Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949), the Court overruled May v.
Heiner, 281 U.S. 238 (1930), which held that a transfer during life under which the
grantor retained a life estate would remove the property from the decedent's gross
estate. May v. Heiner had been made inapplicable to certain transfers made after
March 3, 1931 and June 7, 1932 by action of Congress, but Com'r v. Church went
behind these dates. Congress responded to the Treasury's victories in Church and
Spiegel by obliterating Church, although it took three acts to accomplish this, and
removing most of the teeth of Spiegel. Int, Rev. Code of 1954, § 2037, reflects the
domesticated Spiegel.
58 A non-uniform price has been proposed for the multiple corporation benefits.
See Note, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 485 (1960). The author's idea is to permit the use of
multiple corporations only where (1) the separate corporation is to undertake a business
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It should be obvious that many examples of this benefit-for-a-
price phenomenon exist. One instance in which the price is fairly
clearly reflected in the precise language of the Code is the Clifford
legislation. Examine section 674. The grantor of a trust can "buy"
immunity from taxation on the income therefrom and substantial
control of enjoyment of income and corpus by employing certain
designated trustees. 59
 A similar price is demanded from a donor mak-
ing a gift to a minor in a manner which will yield the return of an
annual exclusion under the gift tax and elimination from the donor's
gross estate for estate tax purposes.'"
Indeed, I rather think that the "business purpose" doctrine and
the "thin incorporation" problem can be meaningfully presented as
instances in which at least one aspect of the problem is to determine
both the price of the benefit and whether it has been paid. In both,
the search tends to be to determine whether enough of the disadvan-
tages of the purported relationship exist to justify the award of the
tax advantage to the taxpayer. Thus, in "thin incorporation" cases
counsel for the taxpayer marshals the factors which tend to show that
the "burden" of debt has in fact been shouldered." In determining
unrelated to that of the existing corporation or group and (2) where the size of the
new business is substantial in relation to the size of the business presently being con.
eluded. This view is premised upon the author's conception of the purpose of the
corporate surtax exemption and accumulated earnings credit, viz., to encourage the
growth and expansion of small business. Thus, the benefits should cost small business
less than they do large business. An intriguing exercise would consist of working out
the devices which would increase the price of benefits in more or less direct proportion
to the increase in gross income of the taxpayer. Or should the increase be progressive?
59
 Thus, where the grantor is not a trustee and no more than half of such trustees
"are related or subordinate parties who are subservient to the wishes of the grantor," a
power "to spray" income and corpus among beneficiaries may be given the trustees.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 674(c). Where the grantor is a trustee the power to accumulate
income or to distribute corpus is much more restricted. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §
674(b)(5) and (6). The institutional trustee is not harmed by these provisions. See
note 56 supra.
414.) Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 2503(c) permits gifts to minors to qualify for the
annual exclusion if the property and income therefrom may be expended for the benefit
of the minor before he reaches the age of twenty one and to the extent not so expended
will pass to him at that time or to his estate should he die before such time. However,
the donor should not be the trustee or custodian of such gifts because his death during
the term of the trust or custodianship will result in the gift property being included
in his gross estate. See Lober v. U.S., 346 U.S. 335 (1953); Rev. Rul. 57-366, 1957-2
Cum. Bull. 618.
az Thus, taxpayers will emphasize, where it is possible to do so, such factors as the
form of the "debt" instrument, the reasonableness of the ratio between debt and equity,
the lack of proportionality between the advances in question and the admitted risk
capital, the willingness of outside investors to supply the funds on substantially the same
terms, their expectation of repayment, and the similarity of the use to which the funds
were put to uses to which the proceeds of commercial Ioans are put. From the viewpoint
of the taxpayers and their tax counsel the problem is to determine the point at which
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whether a transaction serves a "business purpose" the courts tend to
question whether commercial disadvantages were assumed by the
taxpayer in the transaction which he asserts should yield a tax
advantage . 62
This examination of the extent of conformity to the rule of good
law possessed by our federal tax laws should close by describing
several other aspects of this law which very nicely demonstrate our
desire to have an admixture of risk and security in our society. We
pride ourselves on the existence of risk; but we also seek means to
reduce or eliminate it. Correspondingly we possess a tax law which
has an adventitious side to its character; but we constantly strive to
make its operation more predictable. I doubt seriously if we truly
wish to eliminate this accidental quality of the Iaw despite efforts on
the part of both the Government and the taxpayers to efface it.
In any event, examples of these tendencies are quite common.
Our judicial procedure for the disposition of tax cases could hardly
be better designed to assure some chance, even though it be remote,
to all litigants, including the Government." Our procedure in formu-
lating and enacting tax laws has its capricious aspects." We have
the "cost" of these factors surpasses the tax advantages of the "debt" characterization.
Needless to say, taxpayers often yield to the temptation of asserting that the "cost"
has been incurred where that is not in fact the case. Counterfeit money is not un-
known in the tax market. For the presently leading case in this area, see Gilbert
v. Com'r., 248 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1957). The Tax Court's opinion on remand,
Gilbert v. Com'r., 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 29 (1958), and the affirmance of this decision
in Com'r. v. Gilbert, 262 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1959) are interesting. See generally Caplin,
The Caloric Count of a Thin Corporation, N.Y.U. 17th Tax Inst. 771 (1959), 43 Marg.
L. Rev. 31 (1959); Bittker, Thin Capitalization: Some Current Questions, 34 Taxes 830
(1956).
62
 Compare note 53 supra. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935), the starting
point in all discussions of the "business purpose" doctrine, has come to mean many
things. See Paul, Studies in Federal Taxation, Third Series 125 (1940). The doctrine
does not condemn directly tax avoidance motives, but it does teach that these motives
will be frustrated unless the taxpayers assume some, if not all, of the burdens inherent
in the characterization of their transaction which they wish the tax law to adopt. Judge
Learned Hand, In Gilbert v. Com'r, 248 F.2d 399, 412 (Zd Cir. 1957), stated that
the doctrine "covers only those transactions that do not appreciably change the taxpayer's
financial position, either beneficially or detrimentally." I think that the detriments are
more important generally than the benefits. While it is true that economic benefits
realized by the taxpayer in the transaction in which he also seeks a tax advantage suggest
a motivation other than tax avoidance, the wise taxpayer often will place more emphasis
upon the economic risks and pitfalls which he assumed in the transaction. Those who
market tax shelters are not unaware of this fact.
63 See Miller, The Courts of Last Resort in Tax Cases, 40 A.B.A.J. 563 (1954);
Pope, A Court of Tax Appeals: A Call For Re-examination, 39 A.B.A.J. 275 (1953);
Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 Harv. L. Rev. 1153 (1944).
64 See Strayer, Fiscal Policy and Politics (1958); Surrey, The Congress and the Tax
Lobbyist—How Special Tax Provisions Get Enacted, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 1145 (1957).
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created an income tax structure with two rate tables, one for ordinary
income and one for capital gains, and left rather vague the criteria
for determining the transactions to which each applies." This
encourages efforts to create techniques to realize the advantages of
the capital gains rate table, and quite often there is a chance for
success." Our search for security manifests itself in the tax structure
by our efforts, growing in scope in recent years, to mark with careful
statutory language the arrangements which will, and will not, be
taxed under the capital gains rate table. The Internal Revenue Code's
Subchapters C and K, introduced in recent years, demonstrate this
trend." Although this trend has been properly criticized 69
 and will be
further critically examined shortly, it is in keeping with the under-
standable and pervasive efforts to minimize the risks of commercial
and family transactions.
However, the desire to balance risk and security is most signifi-
cantly manifested by the major policies which shape the tax law. The
income tax shows this particularly well. There are a number of
reasons which are often used to justify the separate rate for capital
gains." Probably one of the most persuasive of these, at least to
06
 The text probably requires no citation of authority even for those readers who
do not work in the tax field. It is truly amazing how many complex questions in the
Internal Revenue Code arise from, or are influenced by, the capital gain—ordinary in-
come rate differential. For two Supreme Court decisions which occupy commanding
heights over the capital gains plain which fairly swarms with issues both great and
small, see Corn Products Refining Co. v. Com'r., 350 U.S. 46 (1955); Com'r. v. P.G.
Lake, Inc., 356 U.S. 260 (1958). Also see Surrey, Definitional Problems in Capital Gains
Taxation, 69 Marv. L. Rev. 985 (1956).
60 A large portion of the problems involved in the taxation of partnerships and
corporations stem from efforts to be taxed at the lower capital gains rates. Form of the
transaction plays a substantial role in the success or failure of these efforts. See Television
Industries, Inc. v. Com'r, 60-2USTC if 9795, 284 F.2d 322 (2d Cir. 1960) where the tax-
payer argued that the transaction should be taxed as if he had used another form which
would have had the same economic effect. In rejecting this argument the court said:
"The Commissioner is justified in determining the tax effect of transactions on the basis
in which the taxpayers have molded them, (citations omitted), although he may not
always be required to do so (citation omitted). It would be quite intolerable to pyra-
mid the existing complexities of tax law by a rule that the tax shall be that resulting
from the form of transaction taxpayers have chosen or from any other form they might
have chosen, whichever is less. (325).
Or Subchapters C and K relate to the taxation of corporations and partnerships
respectively. The trend is best illustrated in Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 4 341, which
attempts to prevent the conversion of income which would be taxed at ordinary rates
to the corporation into gain taxed at capital rates to the shareholders by means of "col-
lapsing" the corporation. Similar illustrations may be found in the "collapsible partner-
ship" provisions, the detailed rules governing corporate divisions and the receipt of "boot"
in corporate reorganizations, the somewhat uncertain constraints relating to stock redemp-
tions and partial liquidations, and many others.
68 Cary, supra note 14.
49 The best recapitulation of these reasons is in Blum, A Handy Summary of the
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relatively neutral observers, is the contribution the reduced rate makes
to economic growth through encouraging investment and the mobility
of capital. Irrespective of whether the same stimulus could not be
achieved by reducing the rate of progression sharply, the fact remains
that we seek to advance our market and risk-oriented economy by
providing some security against its failure. Various micro-economic
measures to increase security also exist in the tax law. The aged,
the blind," the sick," and the victims of storm, fire and earthquake72
all find some assistance in their hour of need in the income tax. Small
business," farmers," insurance companies," trust companies,"
Capital Gains Arguments, 35 Taxes 247 (1957). Also see Seltzer, The Nature and Tax
Treatment of Capital Gains and Losses (1951); Tax Institute, Capital Gains Taxation,
Panel Discussion (1946).
70
 Int, Rev. Code of 1954, 4 151.
71
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 213.
72
 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 165(c) (3). Like some inscrutable deity the tax Iaw
also offers succor to those who suffer loss because of termites which operate as a sud-
denly invading hostile force but denies its comfort to those whose losses are caused by
termites which stealthily infiltrate and gradually destroy their objective. Rosenberg v.
Com'r., 198 F.2d 46 (8th Cir. 1952).
72 The surtax exemption available to corporations whose taxable income does not
exceed $25,000 and the accumulated earnings credit of $100,000 are obvious examples of
tax aids to small business. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 11 11, 535(c)(2). In 1958 a number
of additional aids were added to the Code. E.g., the additional first-year depreciation al-
lowance for small business, 4 179; the favorable treatment of losses on Small Business
Investment Company and Small Business stock, 11 1242-44; Subchapter S which
permits certain "Small Businesses" to elect a special method of taxation which tends
to reduce taxes at the corporate level, 11 1371-77, The end of such aids is not in
sight. See The Wall Street Journal, Jan. 4, 1961, Tax Report, p. 1.
74 For a good summary of many of the major tax advantages available to farmers,
see Boehm, Tax Accounting For Agriculture 17 Ohio St. L.J. 1 (1956). One of the most
outstanding is the farmer's ability to use a cash basis of accounting even when inventories
are significant. This accounting method cuts the other way, however, when inventory
prices are declining. Self-help by farmers in under-reporting income items exists and is
tolerated by the government. See Kahn, Coverage of Enterprenurial Income on Federal
Tax Returns, Tax Revision Compendium, House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) Vol. 2, 1439.
75 There are numerous ways in which the Code provides tax advantages to those
who invest in insurance. These tax advantages bestow upon insurance companies a
commercial advantage in competing for investment funds. One of these tax advantages
is that the earnings on the savings part of the insurance premiums are seldom taxed.
These earnings, which go to build up the cash surrender and loan values of the policies,
are received by the beneficiaries of the policies upon the death of the insured without tax.
There may be a small tax imposed when the policy is surrendered prior to the death
of the insured; but in no event is the full amount of the earnings made subject to tax.
See Vickery, Agenda For Pr.ogressive Taxation 64-70 (1947). The exclusion of insur-
ance proceeds paid by reason of the death of the insured from the gross income of the
beneficiary sometimes suggests some rather spectacular tax savings possibilities. See
Ducros v. Com'r. 272 F.2d 49 (6th Cir. 1959); Note, 45 Cornell L.Q. 818 (1960).
There are also estate tax advantages available to the investor in insurance, Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, § 2042. Until the Life Insurance Company Act of 1959 the income taxation
of insurance companies was quite favorable in that "underwriting" income and capital
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mineral producers77 and many others78
 find some protection against
economic austerity in this tax. On the other hand, the ideal of the
self reliant person able to encounter the uncertainties of his world
is promoted by encouraging work on the part of children, 79 provision
for retirement through pension plans," the relatively early assumption
of financial responsibilities by childrens' and the discharge of conjugal
responsibilities by adequate provision for the surviving spouse."
Running through many of these policies is not only a sometimes
gains were not includible in the tax base. Some contend that it remains favorable. Lent,
The Tax Treatment of Life Insurance, Tax Revision Compendium, House Committee on
Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), Vol. 3, 1995.
78
 See notes 56 and 59 supra.
77 Percentage depletion and the deduction for intangible drilling and development
costs are too well known to require further comment.
78
 Those who trade in, or derive a living from, stocks and securities are beneficiaries
of the lower rate applicable to capital gains and the dividend received credit and exclu-
sion. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 34, 116. Employees beset with illness may exclude under
certain circumstances a portion of the wages paid by the employer during the period
of misfortune. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 105(d). The timber and coal industries are
entitled to the capital gains rate on a substantial portion of their income. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, II 631, 1231. It is indeed a forgotten man who can not find at least a
crumb dropped from that bountiful table of tax advantages which is the Internal
Revenue Code.
79
 Earnings of a child are not taxable to the parent, and, in the case of a child
under 19 years of age or who is a student, these earnings may exceed $600 without
causing a loss by the parent of his dependency exemption as to the child where over
half of the child's support is furnished by the parent. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 73,
151(e), 152.
80 The basic structure of the tax law's encouragement of pension plans is found in
its treatment of "qualified retirement plans." The employer's contribution is deductible,
the earnings of the fund are exempt, and the covered employees are taxed only upon
receipt of the benefits under such retirement plans. "Evidence of the effectivene .ss of
these tax incentives and the impact of any tax provision on the development of employee-
benefit plans is the tremendous number of qualified retirement plans of many different
types that have been established since 1942. It is currently estimated that well over
50,000 qualified plans with reserves approaching $40 billion now cover about 18 million
employees and indirectly many additional millions of dependents." Seligman, Pension
and Other Employee Benefit Plans, Tax Revision Compendium, House Committee on
Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), Vol. 2, 1353, 1358. It appears probable
that retirement programs for the self employed will receive tax encouragement in the
near future.
Si The income, estate and gift tax advantages of gifts to children with a frequency
and regularity surpassing that which would be the case were the motivations only those
rooted in parental love and affection are well known. The result—parents in somewhat
reduced circumstances watching their offspring "take over the reins" and hoping that
what they retained for themselves will "see them through":—may be poor geriatrics, but
it does provide for an earlier assumption of responsibility by children than would other-
wise be the case. It would be a foolish man who was convinced that the result met the
standard of the utilitarians.
82 The reference is to the marital deduction in the estate and gift tax. Int. Rev.
Code of 1954, §§ 2056, 2523. The estate tax marital deduction fixes the basic pattern
of most estate plans. See note 48 supra.
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offensive display of cunning and greed, but also a praiseworthy effort
to refine the ideal of equal taxation of equals. All realize that there
are times when equal incomes should not be taxed equally because
the surrounding circumstances suggest that to do so will either per-
petuate or create inequalities. Bunched income," income from the dis-
charge of indebtedness which does little to increase the liquidity of the
taxpayer," gains substantially attributable to inflation where reinvest-
ment is necessary as in the case of residences," all are instances which
force us to recognize that "a dollar is a dollar" view of tax equity is
not a perfect measure. Thus, the unattainable ideal of equals taxed
equally moves us to seek means to advance the interests of those
mangled by the dull edge of the "a dollar is a dollar" sword of equity.
By so doing, our purpose is to advance the rule of good law by
bringing to more people the sense of being permitted to share in the
possession of justice, and in the processes by which it is achieved,
and by fostering the sense of belonging and the ability to be an inde-
pendent individual.
Iv
THE EXTENT OF NON-CONFORMITY OF FEDERAL TAXATION TO
THE RULE OF GOOD LAW
The recounting of the many ways in which the tax law measures
up to the bench mark of the rule of good law may suggest that I am
finding "sermons in stones and good in everything." And to some
extent I am. This, however, permits me to make a fundamental point
of this paper. It is that a substantial portion of the characteristics
of the tax law which do not conform to our standard of measure
comes about because of our overzealous efforts to attain such con-
formity. We seek the good but find both good and evil. This is
83
 The reference is to income derived from work or transactions extending over a
number of taxable periods but received or earned in one such period. Progression
often makes the tax greater than it would have been had the income been received
ratably over the taxable periods involved. The almost ideal solution would be some
overall averaging system. The Code now has only a number of provisions dealing with
specific instances of bunched income, Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 1301-07.
84 Discharge of indebtedness does not result in taxable income if the debtor remains
insolvent after the discharge. Astoria Marine Construction Co., 12 T.C. 798 (1949);
Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(b) (1957). The entire problem of the treatment of income arising
from the discharge of indebtedness is a troublesome one which is not comprehensively
treated in the Code or regulations. Throughout the material dealing with the problem
is the recognition that "equity" often demands more than simply a balance sheet
improvement before assessment of a tax is proper. A "spreading device" for income
from discharge of an indebtedness is provided in certain instances. Int. Rev. Code of
1954, §§ 108, 1017.
85 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1034 provides for non-recognition under certain
circumstances.
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nothing new in human experience; indeed, it is one aspect of the Book
of Job. Perhaps a good act always produces an evil result often times
as great, or greater, in magnitude than the good accomplished. Per-
haps also an evil act always produces a good result often surpassing
the scope of its originator. In any event, in framing the tax law we
have tended to ignore the wisdom which extols balance, restraint,
and nothing to excess. In so doing we have given insufficient atten-
tion to opposing forces in man's nature, assuming that if our cause
was right only good could result from our efforts. But there is always
a dark column which marches in the army of the righteous. It loots
while the light forces liberate.
Let me be specific. Each characteristic mentioned as contributing
to the rule of good law is joined with an opposing one which does not.
As the pursuit of the former intensifies the scope of the latter in-
creases. As we raise more funds for armaments to maintain the
peace necessary for survival and the good life, we grow poorer and
more prone to wage war. Progression encourages the wasteful prac-
tice of multiplying taxpayers, fictitious and real," and creates many
tax accounting problems." The illusion by the many respecting the
extent of progression borne by the rich prepares the way for a re-
action of bitterness when the truth is known. In addition, the present
rate structure is maintained, presumably, as a symbol of virtue while
most taxpayers by one means or another escape its full impact. Some
do not, and the tribute exacted from them is the price of this bit of
goodness. Self-assessment penalizes the honest, further erodes honesty
by posing moral dilemmas too onerous to be borne by the ordinary
person, and permits large sums of income to go untaxed." With-
86 See pp. 224-25 supra and note 55 supra. In addition to multiple corporations,
gifts of property in trust, or otherwise, and family partnerships are obvious techniques
for increasing the number of taxpayers. Even more obvious is the joint return device.
87 The problem of "when" an item becomes taxable would be much less significant
were the rate proportional since it would be subject to a flat rate of tax whenever
brought within taxable income. Probably, however, there would still be pressure from
the government to collect the tax as early as possible and from the taxpayer to defer
such collection. Certainly this would be the case if the present forgiveness at death
continued. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, 1014. Nonetheless, it is likely that without
progression some of the anomalies of tax accounting, such as the inclusion in gross
income of the entire amount of advance income payments received by an accrual basis
taxpayer, could be eliminated. Even without such a sweeping change there is some
indication that the particular anomaly mentioned, the prepaid income problem, may be
eliminated. See Beacon Publishing Co. v. Com'r, 218 F.2d 697 (10th Cir. 1955);
Bressner Radio, Inc. v. Comm'r, 267 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1959).
88 It is useful to bear in mind, however, that more income tax is collected through
self-assessment than withholding. Kahn, Compliance and Enforcement Problems, Tax
Revision Compendium, House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959), Vol. 2, 1467, 1468. Former Commissioner Harrington recently stated that about
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holding partially conceals from the taxpayer the magnitude of the
burden he carries and thus reduces his ability to rationally evaluate
the merits of proposed expenditures." Thus, in time the perfervid
pursuit of equality, through taxation as well as otherwise, will collide
with liberty and overtake mediocrity.
The immanence of non-conformity with the rule of good law in
efforts to attain conformity is nowhere better revealed than in the
aspects of the tax structure which reflect our desires about the proper
balance between the individual and the group. It will be recalled
that the taxes are designed for a money and market oriented economy.
The imposition of taxes so designed, however, encourages the growth
of what the British call perquisites at the expense of wages and
salaries" and the development of barter at
 The rationalism demanded
by both our calculating, record-keeping society and our tax system
distorts the operation of the market92 (as the illustrations I used
24 billion of income was not reported in 1957. Harrington, Improving Income Tax
Reporting, Id. at 1461. It has been estimated that dividend income and interest income
was under-reported 1.2 billion and 3.5 billion, respectively, in 1957. Holland, Under-
Reporting of Dividends and Interest on Tax Returns, Id. at 1397. There is some
indication that there has been some decline in this under-reporting recently.
89
 Seldom is this unfavorable characteristic of withholding mentioned in the current
literature on the subject. Generally administrative difficulties are emphasized in
resistance to the extension of withholding. For proposals suggesting a substantial
expansion of withholding, see Atkeson, Improvements In Tax Administration and Com-
pliance, Tax Revision Compendium, House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959), Vol. 2, 1499, 1501. The theme implicit in the text is developed fully
in the statement of the Roman Catholic Bishops of the United States, November 19,
1960 on the personal responsibility of free men. N. Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1960, § 1, p. 74.
00
 "Yet it is clear also that there is a steady drive by organized labor to have
employers increasingly bear the living expenses of their employees. Whatever may have
been the arrangements and traditions that existed prior to the income tax, it is evident
today that tax considerations play an important, if not major role in the extension of
fringe benefits. It is obvious that a mass income tax must squarely face these changing
patterns of compensation which it generates. . . ." Surrey, The Federal Income Tax
Base for Individuals, 58 Colum. L. Rev. 815, 824 (1958).
01 Exchanges of properties of a "like kind" do not result in recognition of gain
or loss. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1031. This makes sense in a money and market-
oriented economy. However, to take advantage of this provision property exchange
clubs have sprung up in recent years. See Wall Street Journal, Sept. 15, 1960, p. 1,
col. 4.
92 Such a statement as this should always be read against the fact that practically
all tax systems alter the choices which would otherwise be made in a free market.
Certainly this is true of the income tax. "Legislators who could devise an income tax
system in which preferences are eliminated would enshrine themselves in the minds
and hearts of men forever. However, a graduated income tax system by its very nature
cannot be solely a revenue raising device without overtones of social and economic
engineering." Galvin, The Deduction For Percentage Depletion and Exploration And
Development Costs, Tax Revision Compendium, House Committee on Ways and
Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), Vol. 2, 933, 941. Nonetheless, it is possible so to
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above should have indicated)," diverts countless man-hours of
thought from other activities which possibly would be more produc-
tive,94
 imposes heavier tax burdens on those not wise enough to obtain
(or fortunate enough to get) the best tax advice, 95
 and probably in-
creases the sense of helplessness and of being alone of all who attempt
to complete their own returns. The benefit-for-a-price structure, while
conforming to our ingrained habits of trade, encourages the quest
for bargain-counters and in many cases twists transactions from
"normal channels." However, it must be said that as time passes and
the pre-income tax days fade from memory the guide line of the
"normal transaction"—what the parties would have done in the
absence of taxes—becomes quite indistinct. 96
 Perhaps "what the
parties would have done under the next preceding Code" will take its
place.
Our admixture of risk and security reflected in the tax structure
also carries a burden of non-conformity. The capricious side of the
law as written and administered certainly violates the canon of equals
taxed equally." The elaborate specificity of the law obviously tends
to make the law more capricious by creating a horde of new issues"
design the tax structure as to increase or decrease its compatability to a free market.
Maximum compatability is not a feature of our present tax system.
93 See pp. 221-23 supra.
94 We simply do not know the total cost of administering our present income,
estate and gift tax. More, much more, investigation of such matters should be under-
taken. Naturally this cost includes the maintenance of the vast army of tax advisers,
one or more of whose members are detailed to guard and protect every transaction of
any substantial economic consequence in American Life.
95 On what constitutes the "best" tax advice, see Darrell, Some Responsibilities of
the Tax Adviser in Regard to Tax Minimization Devices, N.Y.U. 8th Tax Inst.
983 (1950) and the sequel, Conscience And Propriety In Tax Practice, N.Y.U. 17th
Tax Inst. 1 (1959).
1b For example, is the manner of financing acquisitions of mineral properties before
the evolution of the A B C device (whatever that manner was) the "normal transac-
tion"? Or, what is the "normal" way to go about merging corporations? The tech-
niques which existed prior to 1913?
97
 On the capriciousness inherent in giving the triers of fact large discretion in
determining whether a tax law characterization, such as "gift," is applicable to a
specific fact situation, see Griswold, The Supreme Court, 1959 Term, Foreword: Of
Time and Attitudes—Professor Hart and Judge Arnold, 74 Harv. L. Rev. 81, 88-91
(1960).
98 See Cary, supra note 14. Professor Brown has recently addressed himself to this
problem and the pith of his remarks can be conveyed by the following extract: "I have
said that the stated purpose of elaborate statutory formulation is to produce certainty
and predictability. One may say with some assurance that this purpose has scarcely
been achieved. To take a few examples, one may say that §§ 302 (with 318), 306, 341,
346, 354, and 355 (with 368), 381 and 382 have added little, if anything, to pre-existing
certainty, while each has brought with it a steadily increasing progeny of new uncertain-
ties. But I believe the purpose of the current type of formulation springs from related
but deeper roots. Fundamentally, it appears to spring from an attempt to eliminate,
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which, if they do not completely bewilder the taxpayer and the
government employees, will introduce additional "trading bait" in
settlements and compromises. In addition, their presence slows analy-
sis of tax issues and thus adds to the burden of administering the
taxes.
Most important, however, is that the policies we employ to
further the virtues of individuals and the economic growth and
stability of our business enterprises, while in one sense attaining their
ends, to some degree increase dependence upon the existing tax law.
People and money move in the channels cut by the tax law.
Lives and fortunes become committed to structures supported by a
few words in the Code. Depletion and capital gains are cases in
point." When the precariousness of this support is realized there is
good reason to feel adrift and severed from reality. "To each accord-
ing to the will of Congress" is not always preferable to "To each
according to the free market," or "To each according to custom."
Estrangement from reality is further enhanced by the fact that
as we employ in the tax law an increasing number of devices to
promote our notions of virtue and the good economic life the con-
sequence of each becomes more uncertain.'" Each device has its own
so far as possible, the necessity for responsible administration. Experience seems to be
demonstrating that this is foredoomed to failure." Brown, An Approach To Subchap-
ter C, Tax Revision Compendium, House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1959), Vol. 3, 1619, 1620.
99
 Having been privileged to live in Texas and the Northeast, I have noticed what
appears to me to be a certain degree of similarity of response by many inhabitants of
both regions to suggestions that one of their dominant tax advantages (depletion, of
course, in respect to Texans and capital gains to Easterners) be eliminated. I need not
describe the nature of the response.
100 See, Brown, Purposes and Functions of Depreciation Under the Income Tax,
Tax Institute, Depreciation and Taxes {1959) for a discussion of the conflict between
monetary policies directed against inflation and liberal depreciation allowances. The
substance of the case against too frequent use of the tax law to promote particular social
and economic ends recently has been put succinctly by Professor Blum as follows:
"However, it is worth underscoring that subsidies through the income tax are likely to
be especially pernicious. I merely repeat myself and many others in noting that by
nature such subsidies tend to he hidden; their magnitudes are very hard to estimate;
their efficacy is difficult to gage; no agency is charged with watching over and reporting
on them; the recipients are by and large unidentified; some of their effects usually are
unintended; and they do not appear as expenditures in the Government budget. All in
all, a less desirable form of administering a subsidy is not easily imagined. But this is a
relatively minor point. By economic standards it is the dimensions of many tax subsidies
rather than the shortcomings in the mechanism for administering them which is more
significant—and that matter, I trust, has already been put in its proper place." (Italics
added.) Blum, Tax Policy and Preferential Provisions In The Income Tax Base, Tax
Revision Compendium, House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1959), Vol. 1, 77, 83. "Incentive taxation," as tax subsidies have sometimes been called,
has been criticized by some of the leading writers in the field of tax policy. See Groves,
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built in contradiction and there arises the necessity to work out
difficult accommodations between them. The differential rate on
capital gains and accelerated depreciation, for example, are both
designed, at least in part, to promote economic growth. Both, as
noted, draw the economy closer to dependence upon tax policy,
partially frustrate the purpose of progression, and generate the neces-
sity of accommodation between themselves. This necessity is clearly
discernible when the taxpayer disposes of a section 1231 asset,'
after depreciation at a rapid rate, for a price in excess of its adjusted
basis.' The gain, taxable at capital gains rates under section 1231,
represents business earnings, the tax on which was not only deferred
but is assessed at a rate lower than that which applies to other such
earnings.'" Accommodation is fairly simple here, although it has not
been done as yet, because all that is required is to provide that the
gain is taxable as ordinary income.'" It is not so simple in other
areas, however. Capital gains rates and Subchapter S, 1°5 the pro-
visions of which in a general sense permit a corporation to be taxed
somewhat in the manner of a partnership, attempt in quite different
fashions to promote a sound economy. The collapsible corporation
provisions are designed to curb an abuse of capital gains which con-
sisted of selling or liquidating a corporation after its earning poten-
tial was fairly predictable but before such income was realized and
having the gain taxed at capital gains rates.'" This curb is now
undercut to some extent by Subchapter S which permits gains on the
sale of capital assets by the corporation to be "passed through" to
Postwar Taxation and Economic Progress 14, 303-06 (1946) ; Vickery, Agenda For
Progressive Taxation 392 (1947).
101 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231(b).
102 The depreciation referred to is that presently allowed under Int. Rev. Code of
1954, § 167. Section 1238 of the Code precludes the application of § 1231 to the gain from
the sale or exchange of property subject to the amortization deduction of emergency
facilities under § 168.
103 See Surrey and Warren, Federal Income Taxation 705 (1960 ed.).
104 Id. There is, however, a special sort of irony apparent when one considers
the origin of the necessity for "accommodation." Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1231, came
into the law in 1942 to relieve taxpayers of ordinary income tax rates on gains resulting
from involuntary conversions and sales and exchanges prompted by the circumstances
of the war effort. It has remained, however, as a permanent part of our capital gains
structure. For a good description of the history of § 1231 see, Bittker, Federal Income,
Estate and Gift Taxation 403-06 (1958).
1°5 See note 73 supra.
100 Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 341. These provisions in a somewhat less complex
form Pint made their appearance in the law in 1950. The curb is to make the gain on
sale or liquidation taxable as ordinary income. However, the curb may be avoided
by having the corporation realize a substantial portion of the income before the sale or
liquidation. E.g., Kelley, 32 T.C. 135 (1959).
236
THE RULE OF GOOD LAW AND FEDERAL TAXATION
the shareholders and there taxed at capital gains rates. 107 Where these
assets have a fairly predictable earning power the necessity for
accommodation between Subchapter S and the paraphernalia of capital
gains becomes obvious.' And so it goes. As the devices multiply,
additional correctives are spawned which, in turn, require further
adjustments which, in their turn, make necessary adjustments to
adjustments. In due course the effectiveness of any measure which is
designed to promote fairly specific social, economic and political ob-
jectives becomes more difficult to ascertain. Slowly the waters of
futility and bewilderment rise until they lap at the citadel of reason.
Finally, in many respects the most frustrating of our efforts is
that by which we seek to refine the ideal of equal taxation of equals.
The task is never ending and, in time, will create statutory monstros-
ities. Not only is this true because of the difficulty in technically work-
ing out the means of achieving our ideal,'° 9 but also because circum-
stances and our notions of equality change. While it is true that "a
dollar is a dollar" notion of equity is far from perfect, it does possess
the virtue of simplicity. Refinements of the ideal unavoidably draw
upon our views of distributive justice and these change. Consider
depletion again. Discovery value depletion, the forerunner of per-
centage depletion, was introduced to accomplish, inter alia, the elim-
ination of the necessity of sale of oil discoveries by their finders to
others."° In one sense, this was to provide equal taxation of equals,
but also it reflected a judgment about the proper ordering of our
economic life, and, thus, distributive justice. Certainly similar con-
siderations prompt both proponents and opponents of the present
depletion structure. These changes in our notions of distributive
justice give us new insights into the meaning of equality for the pur-
pose of imposing equal tax burdens. One more example which should
be approvingly received by my academic readers is this. Can it not
be said that the increasing ability of the service to discern the ideal
107 See Caplin, Subchapter S—Election of Small Business Corporations, Tax Revi-
sion Compendium, House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959),
Vol. 3, 1711, 1715.
108 An attempt to do so is made in Treas. Reg. § 1.1375-1(d) (1959).
1°9 A home owner who sells his residence at a gain attributable to inflation and
purchases another at the same price at which the former was sold has a strong claim
for avoidance of tax on the gain. He can say, with considerable force, that his gain
does not make him equal to one who sold securities at a gain. In any event, the Code
has accepted his argument. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 1034. However, to work out
the details required ten subsections, (a) through (j), many of which contain sub-
sections, and all of which contain more than fifty words.
. 110 See Sneed, The Economic Interest—An Expanding Concept, 35 Tex. L. Rev.
307, 314 (1957),
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of which we speak in the issue of deducting educational expenses"'
is partly due to the somewhat greater recognition and acceptance since
Sputnik of the view that the educator's share of our wealth should be
increased? The arguments over tax law are not bottomed simply on
"whose ox is being gored," but much also turns on the issue whether
"what is being gored is an ox."
V
MEASUREMENT AND SUGGESTIONS
Notwithstanding these growing defects in our tax law, it is, on
balance, in substantial conformity to the rule of good law. Of this
fact we can be proud. It cannot be made perfect because, to para-
phrase Lincoln, it is of, for, and by the people. It accomplishes rea-
sonably well the three purposes served by the rule of good law. Its
defects are those which demand understanding and compassion, traits
not particularly prominent in the American character, because al-
though many spring from greed (a characteristic which also works in
favor of a good tax law) most are rooted in a zeal to do good work.
Were I the lawgiver, a thought which causes as many shudders
in me as, I am sure, it does in those readers who have reached this
point in a state of mild frenzy induced by repeated inner shouts of
"NO! NO!," there would be a number of changes in the law. Most
of these, shaped largely by the writings of Simons, were presented in
skeletal form some time ago to a Congressional Committee' which
listened with more deference than I deserved, but whose sophisticated
air led me to realize that I was as far removed from the world of prac-
tical tax politics as in my heart I had suspected I was.
So chastened, there will be no ticking off of twenty or more
specifics which must be adhered to if doom is to be avoided. Instead
this venture into jurisprudential taxation will close by suggesting
only two fairly concrete guides to be used in formulating tax policy.
The discussion to this point has foreshadowed them. The first is to
depart infrequently from the "a dollar is a dollar" concept of tax
equity. The second, which is largely implicit in the first, is to pursue
in the tax law only a limited number of social, economic and political
objectives and to restrict these to those about which there is a wide
consensus. It may be thought that both are inconsistent with the
variety which has been shown to be in keeping with the purposes of
111 The reference is to Treas. Reg. 	 1.162-5 (1958) which increased substantially
the scope of educational expenses which the Commissioner is willing to consider as
ordinary and necessary expenses in carrying on a trade or business.
112 Major Objectives of and Guides for Income Tax Reform, Tax Revision Com-
pendium, Flouse Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959), Vol. 1, 61.
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the rule of good law. A rigid inflexible adherence to "a dollar is a
dollar" equity and a narrow, all consuming, pursuit of one objective
(reduced inequality, for example) would be. What is being suggested
is simply the avoidance of the other extreme—the frenzied and un-
critical effort to attain a vast multitude of social, economic and poli-
tical objectives. Such an effort is self defeating. The accomplishments
of progression, as modest as they are, will be further jeopardized.
The objectives which rest on a wide consensus will be frustrated by
unexpected contradictions created by efforts to attain ends which en-
joy lesser support, and the extent to which any are achieved will be-
come quite obscure. The avoidance of near chaos and the achieve-
ment of any fairly concrete end depend upon the moderate pursuit
of a relatively few social, political and economic objectives.
Obviously my suggestions come down to saying only that we
should pursue neither too few nor too many objectives in our tax law.
This is a commonplace, but one which we may be about to forget.
Perhaps I am again being naive to suppose that my suggestions will
be heeded, but their practicality depends on nothing more than their
acceptance. Perhaps I have no right to expect this, but my conscience
and my profession make it my responsibility to suggest it.
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